

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 299277
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

66011
DRAFTED BY EUR/RPE:WHDAMERON
APPROVED BY W.H.DAMERON
-----059395 160026Z /61
R 151709Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO ALL OECD CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 299277

FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 17880 ACTION SECSTATE
INFO BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST SOFIA PRAGUE WARSAW GENEVA
USNATO USUN PEKING 12 DEC 77

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 17880

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: EEWT ECON EAID HX UR
SUBJECT: INCREASING CEMA COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

REF: (A) STATE 289920, (B) MOSCOW 12331,
(C) STATE 191928 (NOTAL)

1. WE APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S INTEREST IN EXAMINING WHETHER
AND HOW US INTERESTS MIGHT BE ADVANCED THROUGH INCREASED INVOL-
VEMENT OF CEMA COUNTRIES IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND INSTITU-
TIONS, PARTICULARLY - WE ASSUME- THOSE WHERE THE NORTH/SOUTH
DIALOGUE IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT. RECIPIENTS OF REF B WILL BE
AWARE THAT WE WERE EXAMINING QUESTION OF SOVIET ROLE IN SUCH
INSTITUTIONS AND NOT NECESSARILY THE LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 299277

QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL CEMA STATES. AT A LATER DATE,
ONCE WE HAVE SEEN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER RECIPIENT POSTS,
WE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT FROM THE ASPECT OF THE
SOCIET VIEW ON THE BROADER QUESTIONS RAISED IN REF A.

2. WE UNDERSTAND AND WELCOME THE PURPOSE OF A FRESH LOOK
AT THE SUBJECT, ONE WHICH DOES NOT CONFINE ITSELF TO

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND PAST PRACTICE. THERE IS EVERY REASON FOR US TO EXAMINE PROSPECTS FOR WINNING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS WE AND OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS ARE MAKING TO DEVELOP A MORE JUST AND DURABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD. IF THESE EFFORTS CAN IMPROVE US-SOVIET OR EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE PROCESS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

3. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, EXPRESS A NOTE OF CAUTION ABOUT THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE BEST POSSIBILITIES FOR REAL COOPERATION LIE IN EACH INSTANCE WITH QUIET BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USSR (AND OTHERS). AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE RESISTANCE OF THE SOVIETS TO ASSUMING A GREATER AND MORE EQUITABLE SHARE OF THE BURDEN IS VERY STRONG. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE DEPARTMENT'S APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT HAMMERING ON THE TABLE WILL NOT MOVE THE USSR, BUT WE DOUBT THAT WE WILL DO MUCH BETTER WITH THEM IN THE DRAWING ROOM. THEY STILL SEE THEIR INTEREST IN THE THIRD WORLD AS PRIMARILY AND EVEN FUNDAMENTALLY CONFLICTING WITH OUR OWN. PERSUADING THEM TO OPEN THEIR POCKETBOOKS, EXCEPT ON THEIR OWN TERMS, WILL BE A FORMIDABLE TASK.

4. WE FEEL THAT THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ENCOURAGING THE USSR TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A FORM CONSONANT WITH OUR INTERESTS IS THROUGH PRESSURE - AND NOT NECESSARILY QUIET - FROM THE LDC'S THEMSELVES. TOWARDS THIS GOAL, WE SUSPECT THERE IS LITTLE THE US CAN CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY, UNTIL AND UNLESS THE SOVIETS FEEL THE HEAT FROM THOSE WHOSE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 299277

GOOD OPINION THEY VALUE HIGHLY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A TOO OPEN ADVOCACY BY US OF THIS COURSE WITH THE LDC'S IS UNLIKELY TO BE PROMOTIVE OF THE OBJECTIVE. IF THERE IS, HOWEVER, A ROLE FOR "QUIET DIPLOMACY", WE BELIEVE IT LIES IN DISCREETLY ENCOURAGING THE MORE RESPONSIBLE LDC'S TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. (WE TRIED THIS THESIS ON A SENIOR LDC REP HERE WHO FULLY CONCURRED, ALTHOUGH POINTING OUT THAT THE RECENT SETBACK IN THE NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONSHIP MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO OPT OUT). THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT LDC PRESSURES DO BOTHER THE SOVIETS, EVEN THOUGH THEY RESIST THEM. A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO DEALS WITH ALL NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RECENTLY CONFIDED TO US THAT HE HAD COME TERRIBLE HOURS AT AN UNCTAD MEETING IN GENEVA DUE TO THE DEMANDS OF THE LDC'S, WHICH HE VIEWED AS TOTALLY UNREASONABLE AND UN-ACCEPTABLE. EVEN THOUGH HIS MAIN DISCUSSANTS WERE AN ETHIOPIAN, WITH WHOM THE SOVIETS ARE OTHERWISE RATHER CHUMMY THESE DAYS, AND A JAMAICAN THE OFFICIAL SAID HE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO LEAVE THE PREMISES AND TURN THE SESSION OVER TO HIS DEPUTY, TO WHOM HE SAID HE GAVE CARTE BLANCHE TO AGREE TO NOTHING. WE REAGRD THIS AS AN AUTHENTIC SOVIET VIEW, BOLSTERED BY THEIR OWN SELF-IMAGE OF INNOCENCE FOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD AND THEIR CUSTOMARY TIGHTFISTEDNESS ABOUT TRANSFERRING THEIR ASSETS

TO OTHERS FOR A PURPOSE THEY CANNOT CONTROL. IF ANYONE CAN
MOVE THEM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LDC'S ARE IN THE BEST POSITION
TO DO SO. AT THE VERY LEAST, SOVIET RESISTANCE TO LDC PRESSURES
WILL GO FAR TO UNDECEIVE THOSE IN THIRD WORLD WHO STILL MAY BE
INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE MYTH OF THE USSR AS CHAMPION OF THE
OPPRESSED. IF THE LDC'S WERE TO MAKE IT WARM ENOUGH FOR
THE SOVIETS, THE LATTER MIGHT EVEN BE SLIGHTLY MORE INCLINED TO
CONSULT US OVER WHAT WOULD BY THEN BE A "COMMON PROBLEM."
TOON.
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 299277

ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPE:WHDAMERON

APPROVED BY: EUR/RPE:WH DAMERON

-----033416 292024Z /66

R 291905Z DEC 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6170

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 299277

FOL TEL SENT ACTION ALL OECD CAPITALS FROM SECSTATE DTD 15

DEC 1977 QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 299277

FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 17880 ACTION SECSTATE

INFO BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST SOFIA PRAGUE WARSAW GENEVA

USNATO USUN PEKING 12 DEC 77

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 17880

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: EEWT ECON EAID HX UR

SUBJECT: INCREASING CEMA COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

REF: (A) STATE 289920, (B) MOSCOW 12331,
(C) STATE 191928 (NOTAL)

1. WE APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S INTEREST IN EXAMINING WHETHER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 299277

AND HOW US INTERESTS MIGHT BE ADVANCED THROUGH INCREASED INVOL-
VEMENT OF CEMA COUNTRIES IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND INSTITU-
TIONS, PARTICULARLY - WE ASSUME- THOSE WHERE THE NORTH/SOUTH
DIALOGUE IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT. RECIPIENTS OF REF B WILL BE
AWARE THAT WE WERE EXAMINING QUESTION OF SOVIET ROLE IN SUCH
INSTITUTIONS AND NOT NECESSARILY THE LARGER AND MORE COMPLEX
QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL CEMA STATES. AT A LATER DATE,
ONCE WE HAVE SEEN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER RECIPIENT POSTS,
WE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT FROM THE ASPECT OF THE
SOCIET VIEW ON THE BROADER QUESTIONS RAISED IN REF A.

2. WE UNDERSTAND AND WELCOME THE PURPOSE OF A FRESH LOOK
AT THE SUBJECT, ONE WHICH DOES NOT CONFINE ITSELF TO
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND PAST PRACTICE. THERE IS EVERY REASON
FOR US TO EXAMINE PROSPECTS FOR WINNING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
FOR THE EFFORTS WE AND OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS ARE MAKING
TO DEVELOP A MORE JUST AND DURABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
DEVELOPING WORLD. IF THESE EFFORTS CAN IMPROVE US-SOVIET OR
EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE PROCESS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

3. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, EXPRESS A NOTE OF CAUTION ABOUT THE
ASSUMPTION THAT THE BEST POSSIBILITIES FOR REAL COOPERATION
LIE IN EACH INSTANCE WITH QUIET BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
USSR (AND OTHERS). AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE RESISTANCE OF THE
SOVIETS TO ASSUMING A GREATER AND MORE EQUITABLE SHARE OF THE
BURDEN IS VERY STRONG. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE DEPARTMENT'S
APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT HAMMERING ON THE TABLE WILL NOT
MOVE THE USSR, BUT WE DOUBT THAT WE WILL DO MUCH BETTER WITH
THEM IN THE DRAWING ROOM. THEY STILL SEE THEIR INTEREST IN THE
THIRD WORLD AS PRIMARILY AND EVEN FUNDAMENTALLY CONFLICTING
WITH OUR OWN. PERSUADING THEM TO OPEN THEIR POCKETBOOKS,
EXCEPT ON THEIR OWN TERMS, WILL BE A FORMIDABLE TASK.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 299277

4. WE FEEL THAT THE SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ENCOURAGING
THE USSR TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A FORM
CONSONANT WITH OUR INTERESTS IS THROUGH PRESSURE - AND NOT
NECESSARILY QUIET - FROM THE LDC'S THEMSELVES. TOWARDS THIS
GOAL, WE SUSPECT THERE IS LITTLE THE US CAN CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY,

UNTIL AND UNLESS THE SOVIETS FEEL THE HEAT FROM THOSE WHOSE GOOD OPINION THEY VALUE HIGHLY. WE RECOGNIZE THAT A TOO OPEN ADVOCACY BY US OF THIS COURSE WITH THE LDC'S IS UNLIKELY TO BE PROMOTIVE OF THE OBJECTIVE. IF THERE IS, HOWEVER, A ROLE FOR "QUIET DIPLOMACY", WE BELIEVE IT LIES IN DISCREETLY ENCOURAGING THE MORE RESPONSIBLE LDC'S TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. (WE TRIED THIS THESIS ON A SENIOR LDC REP HERE WHO FULLY CONCURRED, ALTHOUGH POINTING OUT THAT THE RECENT SETBACK IN THE NORTH/SOUTH RELATIONSHIP MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO OPT OUT). THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT LDC PRESSURES DO BOTHER THE SOVIETS, EVEN THOUGH THEY RESIST THEM. A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO DEALS WITH ALL NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RECENTLY CONFIDED TO US THAT HE HAD COME TERRIBLE HOURS AT AN UNCTAD MEETING IN GENEVA DUE TO THE DEMANDS OF THE LDC'S, WHICH HE VIEWED AS TOTALLY UNREASONABLE AND UN-ACCEPTABLE. EVEN THOUGH HIS MAIN DISCUSSANTS WERE AN ETHIOPIAN, WITH WHOM THE SOVIETS ARE OTHERWISE RATHER CHUMMY THESE DAYS, AND A JAMAICAN THE OFFICIAL SAID HE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO LEAVE THE PREMISES AND TURN THE SESSION OVER TO HIS DEPUTY, TO WHOM HE SAID HE GAVE CARTE BLANCHE TO AGREE TO NOTHING. WE REAGRD THIS AS AN AUTHENTIC SOVIET VIEW, BOLSTERED BY THEIR OWN SELF-IMAGE OF INNOCENCE FOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD AND THEIR CUSTOMARY TIGHTFISTEDNESS ABOUT TRANSFERRING THEIR ASSETS TO OTHERS FOR A PURPOSE THEY CANNOT CONTROL. IF ANYONE CAN MOVE THEM, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LDC'S ARE IN THE BEST POSITION TO DO SO. AT THE VERY LEAST, SOVIET RESISTANCE TO LDC PRESSURES WILL GO FAR TO UNDECEIVE THOSE IN THIRD WORLD WHO STILL MAY BE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE MYTH OF THE USSR AS CHAMPION OF THE OPPRESSED. IF THE LDC'S WERE TO MAKE IT WARM ENOUGH FOR THE SOVIETS, THE LATTER MIGHT EVEN BE SLIGHTLY MORE INCLINED TO CONSULT US OVER WHAT WOULD BY THEN BE A "COMMON PROBLEM."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 299277

TOON.
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER UNQTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 15-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE299277
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: WHDAMERON
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770468-0138
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771251/aaaabqwf.tel
Line Count: 263
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1c9ae002-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 STATE 289920, 77 MOSCOW 12331, 77 STATE 191928
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 220501
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INCREASING CEMA COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
TAGS: EEW, ECON, EAID, XH, UR, XX, CEMA
To: OECD POSTS
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1c9ae002-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009